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RECENT DECISIONS
uation testimony premised on a reasonable probability of rezoning
should be rejected.
The condemnee in an eminent domain proceeding has the right to
just compensation, interpreted by the courts to mean fair market
value. But fair market value does not include remote possibilities
under the mistaken application of the rule of reasonable probability
of rezoning. The rule requires evidence which refers to that area in
the particular political subdivision in which the condemned property
is located. The evidence introduced in Snyder v. Commonwealth does
not appear to fit this standard.
ToRTs-Illegitimacy-Illegitimate v. Father-To cause one to be
born into the world as an illegitimate constitutes a tortious act-no
remedy for injuries resulting from this act will be granted.
Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E. 2d 849 (1963).
The defendant is the father of the infant plaintiff. The plaintiff's
mother was induced by the defendant to have sexual relations with
him by a promise of marriage. Because the defendant was already
married, this promise could not be kept.' As a result, the plaintiff
is an illegitimate child. This suit was brought by the plaintiff to
recover damages for his illegitimacy. 2 The suit was dismissed by the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, for failure to state a cause of
action. The Supreme Court of Illinois refused to take the case, and
transferred it to the Appellate Court which affirmed the lower court's
decision.8
1. The plaintiff's mother had no knowledge that the defendant was married
at the time of the act of coition, and therefore, she was a victim of the defend-
ant's fraud.
2. The plaintiff sought damages for the deprivation of his right to be a
legitimate child, to have a normal home, to have a legal father, to inherit from
his paternal ancestors and for being stigmatized as a bastard.
3. According to Illinois Law not all cases can be appealed directly to the
Supreme Court of Illinois.
ILL. REV. STAT. 1961, ch. 110, § 75.
(1) Appeals shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court
(a) in all cases in which a franchise or freehold or the validity
of a statute or a construction of the constitution is involved,
(b) in all cases relating to revenue, or in which the State Is
interested as a party or otherwise and (c) in cases in which the
validity of a municipal ordinance or county zoning ordinances
19631
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In rendering its decision, the court was confronted with several
major problems. The first of these pertained to whether the act of
the defendant was tortious. 4 This problem was resolved in the affirm-
ative. The court felt that the act of the defendant was willful and
perhaps criminal. It was found to be willful because the defendant
was completely indifferent to the foreseeable consequences of his act.
The court stated that the defendant displayed a total disregard for
the rights of others by acting with full awareness that if a child was
born as a result of this sexual relationship, it could not be legitima-
tized by him because of his existing marriage. 5 It also was indicated
that the act may have been criminal in that the married defendant
and the unmarried mother were living together at the mother's apart-
ment. 6 The court concluded that the defendant's act was not only a
moral wrong but was clearly tortious in its nature.
After the court held that the defendant's act was tortious, it dealt
with the problem of whether or not a tort could have been committed
upon the plaintiff. The court indicated that because the concept of
viability no longer seems to be a criterion upon which tort recovery
rests, a tort could have been inflicted upon a being simultaneously
or resolution is involved and in which the trial judge certifies
that in his opinion the public interest so requires.
(2) In all cases in which their jurisdiction is invoked pur-
suant to law, except those wherein appeals are specifically re-
quired by the constitution of the State to be allowed from the
Appellate Court to the Supreme Court . . .
The plaintiff failed to come within this provision and therefore his case was
transferred to the Appellate Court.
4. No precedent could be found on this type of case. The court quoted
from the defense counsel's complaint in describing this claim:
Such a claim is novel. There is no statutory or judicial recognition of
such a claim in Illinois or elsewhere in the United States. There Is no
adverse decision either. In fact, no such claim seems ever to have been
raised in any court in Illinois, of any other Common Law jurisdiction, or
in any Civil Law country either.
5. If the defendant were not married, he would have been able to subse-
quently marry the mother and make the plaintiff legitimate. ILL. REV. STAT.
1961, ch. 89, § 4.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-7.
(a) Any person who cohabits or has sexual intercourse with
another not his spouse commits adultery, if the behavior is open and
notorious, and
(1) the person is married and the other person involved
in such intercourse is not his spouse; or
(2) the person is not married and knows that the other
person involved in such intercourse is married.
[Val. 2 : p. 125
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with its conception. 7 Complaints are now sustained where the child
was not, or might not have been viable at the time of the injury.8
Thus, the court decided that if the plaintiff was conceived before the
completion of the act of coition, he became a human organism con-
currently with the wrongful act, and if life was proven by subsequent
birth, this human life had the same rights at the time of conception
as it has at any time thereafter. 9
However, there is no certainty as to the exact moment conception
occurs; it may take place during or after coition.10 Therefore, the
court was confronted with the problem of whether the defendant
could be held accountable if his act was completed before the plaintiff
was conceived. It was decided that even if the act was performed
prior to conception, a right will arise if there is a causal relation be-
tween the wrongful act and the resulting injury.' 1 The court found
such a relationship and explained it by stating:
If... [the plaintiff's] . . . conception took place after the
act, he was a potential being with essential reality at the
time of the act. The seed was planted, the life process was
started, life ensued and birth followed. The defendant's
wrongful act simultaneously procreated the being whom it
injured.
Therefore, the court concluded the tort to exist and viewed as im-
material whether the plaintiff was conceived during or after the act
of procreation. It explained this decision by the following:
7. Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d. 218, 178 N.E. 2d. 691 (1961), mother
approximately one month pregnant; Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d.
497 (1960); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d. 93 (1960), first month of
pregnancy; Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d. 108 (1958); Hornbuckle
v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E. 2d. 727 (1956), six weeks after
conception; Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S. 2d. 696 (1953), third
month of pregnancy; Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d. 550 (1951).
8. Ibid.
9. The court explained this statement in relation to the cases cited in note
7 which eliminated the criterion of viability for tort recovery. The court added:
The case at bar seems to be the natural result of the present course of
the law permitting actions for physical injury ever closer to the moment
of conception. In point of time it goes just a little further. The signifi-
cance of this course to us is this: if recovery is to be permitted an infant
Injured one month after conception, why not if injured one week after,
one minute after, or at the moment of conception? It is inevitable that
the date will be further retrogressed.
10. Goodrich, NATURAL CHILDBIRTH, 52 (1950); MALOY, LEGAL ANATOMY AND
SURGERY, 668 (2nd. ed. 1955); 1 MARSHALL'S PHYSIOLOGY OF REPRODUCTION, 315
(3rd. ed. 1960); Parker, THE SEVEN AGES OF WOMAN, 198 (1960).
11. Piper v. Hoard, 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887).
.1271963]
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The plaintiff is a person now and he was a potential person
with full capacity for independent existence at the time of
the original wrong. As he developed biologically from poten-
tiality to reality, the wrong developed too. It progressed
as did he, from essence to existence. When he became a
person, the nature of the wrong became fixed. From a moral
wrong and a criminal act against the public, it became a
legal wrong and a tortious act against the individual.
The third problem considered was the character of the plaintiff's
injury. The court believed that although the injury of being born
into the world as an illegitimate is not tangible, it is real, and if
legitimation does not take place, the injury is continuous and irre-
parable. The court cited the Illinois statutory provisions which are
aimed at suppressing a child's illegitimacy as evidence of this
injury.12 However, the court felt that as praiseworthy as these laws
are, no law can make these children whole unless legitimation takes
place. It was resolved that the plaintiff has been placed under a per-
manent disability by his birth, and therefore, the quintessence of the
injury is that the plaintiff was born and that he is.
The final problem considered was whether a remedy should be
granted for this injury. While the court admitted that an action for
damages is implicit in any wrong that is called a tort, 13 in the instant
case it deliberately refused to grant a remedy. This was done despite
12. The court supported this statement by the following:
This liberalization is reflected in the statutes of Illinois: an illegitimate
child has the right to his father's surname; either or both of his parents
may be compelled to support and educate him until he becomes 18 years
of age; his parents have custodial rights; he may be legitimatized by the
marriage of his parents; if a birth certificate has been issued a new one
is issued in the same form as for a legitimate child and the old certificate
is impounded; if he is born following an attempted marriage, where
some form of a lawful marriage ceremony has been performed, he is
considered legitimate; if he is born of an adulterous relation he may be
legitimatized if his parents intermarry and his father acknowledges
him to be his child; in order to facilitate his legitimation, the certificate
of negative finding as to venereal disease in his parents, a prerequisite
to marriage is waived; he is not considered as illegitimate if, after his
conception or birth, the marriage of his parents is declared void; the
consent of his father is not necessary for his adoption; the word 'illegiti-
mate' and the phrase 'born out of wedlock' cannot be used in his adop-
tion petition or decree; he may inherit from his mother and his maternal
ancestors; if his mother has died he may inherit from those from whom
she might have inherited; his issue may take what he would have taken
if he were living; not only his wife and descendants inherit from him,
but his mother and her descendants can also.
13. Prosser, LAW OF TORTS, 1-4 (2nd. 1955).
[Vol. 2 : p. i25
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the court's realization that it was acting inconsistently by recogniz-
ing the tort and refusing the remedy. The court felt that recognition
of this claim would mean the creation of a new tort--an action for
wrongful life. It did not fear that this new tort would open the flood-
gates of litigation concerning illegitimates, but it did fear that the
nature of this action was such that others born into the world under
conditions which they might regard as adverse would be encouraged
to seek relief. 1 4 The court concluded its reasoning for the denial of
a remedy by saying:
... despite our designation of the wrong committed herein
as a tort, because of our belief that lawmaking, while inher-
ent in the judicial process, should not be indulged in where
the result could be as sweeping as here. The interest of
society is so involved, the action needed to redress the tort
could be so far-reaching, that the policy of the State should
be declared by the representatives of the people.
This decision raises difficulties in two areas-one concerning the
court's untroubled recognition of this tort and the other involving
the jurisprudential problem relating to the connection between rights
and remedies. It appears that the tort in this case is not as plain on
its face as was decided by this court. The argument can be raised
that although the defendant's conduct was reckless, this same con-
duct gave the plaintiff life. Therefore, it could be argued that it
would be better to have been born an illegitimate than not to be born
at all. Applying this point of view to the instant case, it could logic-
ally be concluded that to cause one to be born an illegitimate is more
of a benefit than a disability. Thus, it may be that the recognition of
this tort will not be as readily made by others as it was by this court.
As to the right-remedy union violated in this case, it appears that
the court made a compromise decision balancing the potentiality of
an onslaught of radical claims against the granting of, by their own
admission, a justified remedy. It seems that the court by its recogni-
14. The court stated in respect to radical claims:
What does disturb us is the nature of the new action and the related
suits which would be encouraged. Encouragement would extend to all
others born into the world under conditions they might regard as ad-
verse. One might seek damages for being born of a certain color, another
because of race; one for being born with a hereditary disease, another
for inheriting unfortunate family characteristics; one for being born
into a large and destitute family, another because a parent has an un-
savory reputation.
The court also felt that the present case could be just a forerunner of those
which may confront the court in the future because of birth caused because of
artificial insemination or even life created in a test tube.
1963]
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tion of the existence of a tort and refusal of a remedy has ignored
that principle of rational jurisprudence which provides a remedy for
every wrong which is recognized as such by law. ' 5
It is apparent from this decision that the court justified the denial
of this remedy because they feared that the granting of damages
would open the floodgates of radical claims. 1 6 However, it has been
propounded by both courts and legal scholars that neither the possi-
bility of a multiplicity of radical claims,17 nor the fear that a legal
principle will be pushed to an absurdity,' 8 are sufficient grounds to
justify the denial of a legal remedy.
This court created a dilemma when it recognized the defendant's
act as unlawful, but instead of providing a relief to correct the
harms done by this act, it has by refusing a remedy created a privi-
lege or immunity in all such defendants to commit this wrong.
15. It is well settled that for every right or wrong there is a legal remedy,
except in the case of the rights of an individual against a state, or of one nation
against another. 1 C.J.S. Correlation of Right, Wrong, and Remedy, § 4. (1936).
Right and remedy, within the meaning of this rule, are reciprocal; there
can be no right without a remedy, and to deny the remedy is, in sub-
stance, to deny the right. 1 C.J.S. supra.
An action or defense, although one of first impression, may be maintained If,
under any recognized principles of law, the facts involved constitute a violation
of a legal right. 1 C.J.S. Actions of First Impression, § 16. (1936).
Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., Inc., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d. 438 (1941); 1 Am.
Jur. 2d. Novelty of Action, § 49 (1962).
16. Supra., note 8.
17. . .. it is no objection to say, that it will occasion multiplicity of actions;
for if men will multiply injuries, actions must be multiplied too; for every man
that is injured ought to have his recompense. Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938,
92 Eng. Rep. 129 (1703).
18. As to the fear of the court concerning the radicalness of the claims
which will appear, Mr. Justice Holmes stated: "all decisions [are] . . . a series
of points tending to fix a point in a line. 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 28 (1961).
The Supreme Court of Oregon stated:
When a legal principle is pushed to an absurdity, the principle is not
abandoned, but the absurdity is avoided. The courts are competent, we
think, to deal with difficulties of the sort suggested, and case by case,
through the traditional process of inclusion and exclusion, gradually to
develop the fullness of the principle and its limitations. Hinish v. Meir &
Frank Co., Inc., Supra. note 15;
1 Am. Jur. 2d. Supra. note 15.
[Vol. 2: p. 125
